The left hand of all creation (4): An informal algorithm for repurposing worlds

Dorothy Dehner, “New City” (1953).

Faced with an object world, on the standard assumption (i.e., that objects are passive or self-contained), the only option a subject has available is trying to direct and manipulate the objects composing that world. Objects have nothing much to contribute, except the details and difficulty of their pliability. Effectively, on this view, objects are virtually waiting around to be consumed, employed, maximized, or optimized. If we relax or eliminate the standard assumption, however, then objects become agents (however alien or inhuman) with which we negotiate in order to achieve various ends or pursue our programs. Negotiation does not preclude direction, but it does necessitate attending to and taking seriously the agency a given object embodies. Objects have their own sinister pathways. Sinister pathways, entangled together, constitute object worlds. And object worlds must be navigated, not simply commanded. Recall that in navigating, one pings or “reads” the landscape in order to determine various locations (e.g., one’s own location, points of reference, the desired destination), conditions (e.g., of passability, of visibility), and pathways forward. Every navigation entails some degree of negotiation with objects, then, and, indeed, the autonomy of objects makes navigation possible in the first place.

In this regard, to repurpose an object of whatever sort entails an experiment or a gambit insofar as doing so is an attempt to test what an object can do beyond its apparent function, limitations, or purpose (i.e., its current prospectus) as inscribed in its descriptive apparatus. Consequently, to repurpose an object means two things: (1) we transform its prospectus into another prospectus and (2) we thereby change its place within the ontological networks that produce and sustain it. Repurposing always requires the intervention of speculative reason – that is to say, of positing a different world than the world we think is given. On the one hand, repurposing is always a function of symbolic translocation (i.e., redescription), which refers to practices of reinscribing or shifting our symbolic formations (e.g., arguments, concepts, injunctions, metaphors, phrases, texts, words, etc.) into jarring or novel contexts. (In at least one sense, we already do this whenever we coin a neologism, fashion an idiolect, mix a metaphor, or even commit a malapropism.) On the other hand, repurposing always effects a functional or material shift in the object as such. Either there’s a shift in what it does, or there’s a shift in what it can do. We err terribly when we think possibilities are irrelevant or unreal, because every object (and every subject, for that matter) is traversing a distribution of possibilities from instant to instant. That something is possible does not make it actual, but its possibility is a necessary precondition for its actualization. Hence, mapping and remapping distributions of possibility is the work of speculative reason. Because thinking is not a ghostly operation that supervenes upon the world without touching it, speculation remains a form of efficacious action – or, rather, it always and irreducibly accompanies what we identify as action in every case.

Accordingly, here’s a speculative attempt at an informal algorithm for repurposing objects (and therefore object worlds).

Step 1: Identify the target object.
Step 2: Explicate the descriptive apparatus attending the target object. (Note: Look especially for sticking points in the descriptive apparatus, which block or impede further negotiations and revisions.)
Step 3: Craft a redescription.
Step 4: Project possible effects of your revision of the descriptive apparatus (i.e., try to determine how the redescription affects the object’s prospectus).

In a preliminary fashion, let’s look at four example objects subjected to repurposing on this model: two technical artifacts (the Phillips screwdriver and earthships), a social construction (the family form), and a temporal category (the future). Hopefully, selecting such disparate objects will indicate something of the wide range of applications of this algorithm and, thereby, its usefulness as a means for conceptual salvage and (re)engineering.

Example 1: The screwdriver

Example 2: Earthships

Example 3: The family form

Example 4: The future

Excursus 6: Recursion

Go back to Part 3 “Excursus on creative destruction (Spielrein, Schumpeter, Boyd, Land)” or go forward to Part 5 (“Postface on chirality”).